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The takeover of the Gold Ridge mine by Guadalcanal 
militants in June 2000 followed two years of civil conflict 
largely involving groups from the islands of Malaita and 
Guadalcanal, resulting in the evacuation of Malaitans 
from the mine area. This article traces the history of the 
conflict around the mine site and explores the underlying 
reasons for the takeover of the mine. Two rationales for 
the takeover are advanced: the securing of weapons and 
other materials to support the conflict, and ideological 
opposition to resource extraction, particularly gold mining. 
Resource-related grievances rather than greed provide the 
main explanation for the takeover and looting. Key concerns 
registered against the mine include a lack of jobs for locals 
and regional disappointment over the distribution of the 
mine’s revenue.
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From 1998 to 2003, Solomon Islands was 
the scene of civil conflict. The period 
was marked by lawlessness and disorder 
primarily connected to indigenous groups 
from the neighbouring islands of Malaita 
and Guadalcanal. The conflict was confined 
largely to the capital, Honiara, and parts of 
rural Guadalcanal—the largest island in 
the archipelago. The northern plains area 
and central Guadalcanal, including the area 
accommodating a foreign-owned open-pit 
goldmine, Gold Ridge, witnessed extensive 
fighting involving armed militants, police 
and civilians. Gold Ridge mine was in 
operation for 22 months from August 1998. 
During that period, it produced 210,000 
ounces of gold and was the source of 30 
per cent of the country’s GDP (Nanau 
2009:190).
This article draws on the available 
literature and interviews with various pro-
tagonists to explore tensions at the Gold 
Ridge mine,1 focusing primarily on the 
conflict that took place at the mine site 
from 1998 to 2003. It discusses the extent 
to which the mine was both a cause and 
a target of the fighting that took place 
there and the Guadalcanal uprising more 
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broadly. The article also looks briefly at 
the mine’s current operations and some of 
the broader concerns—both historical and 
contemporary—that have been registered 
in relation to the mine.
A looming crisis: 1998 to June 2000
In February 1998, the Guadalcanal Premier, 
Ezekiel Alebua, on behalf of the Guadalcanal 
Provincial Assembly, submitted to the Solo-
mon Islands government its ‘Demands by 
the bona fide and indigenous people of 
Guadalcanal’ (Guadalcanal Provincial 
Assembly 1999). Included was a call ‘that 50% 
of revenue generated through investments 
within the Guadalcanal Province that is 
collected by Government in the forms of 
taxes, levies, license fees etc. be paid to 
the Province’.
This demand was part of a raft of 
requests, the principal one being a claim 
for greater autonomy through a system of 
state government. The demand reflected 
a belief that investment and development 
on Guadalcanal were disproportionately 
supporting the rest of the country at the 
expense of the island’s indigenous inhabit-
ants. It was this particular grievance that 
was to play the dominant role in shaping 
the views of many Guadalcanal militants 
involved in the fighting at the mine.
One of the first tangible demonstra-
tions that Gold Ridge could become a site 
of conflict was the stationing of Police 
Field Force (PFF) and Rapid Response 
Unit (RRU) officers at the mine in 1998. 
The PFF—the feared paramilitary wing 
of the Royal Solomon Islands Police 
(RSIP)—comprised mainly Malaitan police 
officers. Cultural differences characterised 
Malaitan–Guadalacanal relations. The 
police presence—at the request of the 
mine—was intended to provide security; 
however, until May 2000, the deployment 
was to be a continuing cause of tension, 
both with local villages and with Guadal-
canal militants.
A feature of village life at Gold Ridge 
in the late 1990s was the presence of a large 
Malaitan population. Malaitans made up 
the majority of the 400-strong mine work-
force (‘Gold mine boss checks Guadalcanal 
security’, Asia Pulse, 22 June 1999) and 
many Malaitans had married into local 
communities.2
A dominant Malaitan reading of the con-
flict that engulfed Solomon Islands is that 
Malaitans disproportionately contributed to 
the economic development of Guadalcanal 
and Honiara. This is part of a deeper ethno-
narrative of Malaitans as an undervalued, 
and even reviled, working class who were 
the key builders of Solomon Islands (Allen 
2007:165). This view as it relates to Gold 
Ridge is encapsulated in the writings of 
Malaitan chief Michael Kwa’iola
Those who do nothing, expecting 
things to come to them without work 
and sweat can become jealous. That is 
one cause of the conflict. They should 
appreciate that Malaitans were the 
productive, active people who did 
everything in Guadalcanal…It was 
Malaitans who worked for the mining 
company at Gold Ridge, operating 
the machines and earning revenue for 
the government and royalties for the 
Guadalcanal people from their land. 
(Kwa’iola and Burt 2007:115)
In May 1999, Guadalcanal militants, 
fighting under the banner of the Isatabu 
Freedom Movement (IFM), began evicting 
settlers across Guadalcanal, starting in west 
Guadalcanal and then on the plains to the 
east of Honiara. Waves of mainly Malaitan 
refugees left their homes, bound for the capi-
tal, including Malaitans living around Gold 
Ridge. In total, approximately 24,000 settlers 
had been evicted from rural Guadalcanal by 
November 1999 (Fraenkel 2004:61).
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From mid 1999 until about mid 2000, Gold 
Ridge was to be the scene of continuing con-
flict between the mainly Malaitan police and 
local groups (mainly youths).3 As discussed, 
the fighting was linked largely to Malaitan–
Guadalcanal differences related to issues 
of cultural respect, perceived inequitable 
revenue distributions, and Malaitans securing 
jobs on Guadalcanal. Against this backdrop, 
the mine continued to operate; however, 
Guadalcanal leaders increasingly made calls 
for it to cease operations. In mid 1999, Guad-
alcanal provincial leaders backed the mine’s 
closure pending review and renegotiation 
of the mining agreement (‘Solomons’ Gold 
Ridge mine boss vows to continue with 
operation’, Pacific Islands Report, 29 June 
1999).4 In keeping with the tenor of the ‘bona 
fide demands’, such calls were essentially 
to maximise the benefits from the mine to 
the people of Guadalcanal. The then Ross 
Mining managing director, Bertus de Graaf, 
interpreted this position as not being directed 
against the mine per se: ‘I see it more in the 
light that they [Guadalcanal leaders] have a 
fairly big ambit claim on the table, which has 
Gold Ridge as part of it, but it is not directed 
at Gold Ridge’ (‘Solomons’ Gold Ridge mine 
boss vows to continue with operation’, 
Pacific Islands Report, 29 June 1999).
Figure 1 Map of Guadalcanal and Malaita, including the Gold Ridge mine site
Source: World Bank, n.d. Solomon Islands: Guadalcanal and Malaita, including the Gold Ridge mine, Printing, 
Graphics & Map Design, General Services Department, The World Bank, Washington, DC.
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Operations at the mine became progres-
sively more difficult in the latter half of 1999. 
The road to Gold Ridge from Honiara ran 
through an area of protracted conflict. Fight-
ing and the mass displacement of settlers 
in the area had already seen the closure of 
a large palm-oil operation (Fraenkel, Allen 
and Brock 2010:64–75). With IFM roadblocks 
came the necessity to transport expatriate 
mine workers and various materials to 
the mine site from Honiara via helicopter 
(Fraenkel 2004:73).
In late June 1999, a proposed peace 
settlement was negotiated by former Fijian 
coup leader and prime minister Sitiveni 
Rabuka. Signatories to what was dubbed 
‘the Honiara Peace Accord’ were the prime 
minister, the premiers of Guadalcanal and 
Malaita, and the commanders of the main 
militant groups. Rabuka met with the Ross 
Mining managing director, with the former 
acknowledging the importance of the mine’s 
continued operation (Fraenkel 2004:73). The 
eventual text of the accord made reference 
to the mine: ‘Normal operations should 
resume at…the Gold Ridge Mine and other 
industrial establishments bearing in mind 
their contribution to the national economy’ 
(Honiara Peace Accord, 28 June 1999, 
http://www.spc.int/Coastfish/Countries/
solomons/ACCORD.htm:Clause 6[iii]).
The hopes for peace were, however, 
short lived. Fraenkel (2004:71) writes that 
within days of the signing of the accord, 
‘there was a police shoot-out with 15 mili-
tants at the Gold Ridge mine’.
Fighting at the mine site between local 
groups (mainly youths) and police contin-
ued into 2000. As discussed, an element of 
the conflict at the mine site in 1999 and the 
first half of 2000 was violence inflicted by 
the (mainly Malaitan) police stationed at 
the mine against local communities. Nanau 
(2009:214) gives details of an unverified skir-
mish around the village of Tuararana (about 
10 km from the mine) with, a ‘number of 
youths…reportedly killed by government 
supplied guns fired by police officers’.5
In May 2000—purportedly in response 
to a request from Guadalcanal militants—a 
police operation was mounted to evacuate 
Malaitans working at the mine. All Malaitans 
were transported to Honiara. In addition, 
Malaitan police officers stationed at the 
mine were relocated. The northern plains 
had become a no-go zone for Malaitans.
The coup and the Gold Ridge 
raid: June 2000
The turning point of the civil conflict, and 
for the mine, was to occur on 5 June 2000. 
On that day the main Malaitan militant 
group, the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF), in 
a ‘joint operation’ with the police, seized 
control of the police armory at Rove, Hon-
iara, and placed the prime minister under 
house arrest. The armory was raided in 
the early hours of 5 June 2000. According 
to Guadalcanal militants located at Gold 
Ridge, they received the order to raid the 
mine shortly after 10 am (Interview with 
former Guadalcanal Liberation Front mem-
bers, Honiara, 15 December 2009).6 Before 
midday, approximately 20 Guadalcanal 
militants raided Gold Ridge.
The Guadalcanal militants at Gold 
Ridge were senior commanders and young 
males, predominantly from the Weather 
Coast of southern Guadalcanal. Most had 
kinship affiliations. At the time of the raid 
on the armory, many of them were living 
in the Gold Ridge area. Strong ties link 
the Gold Ridge people with those of the 
Weather Coast. The Gold Ridge people (the 
Bahomea) are a sub-tribe of the Malango 
tribe, who migrated from the Weather Coast 
to central Guadalcanal before European 
settlement (Naitoro and Iliescu 1996:6). This 
is evident in the language (spoken by those 
around the mine area) which is influenced 
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by the Talise language of the Weather Coast 
(Roe and Gorecki 1990:14). Today, the bonds 
between the two areas are demonstrated 
by frequent intermigration, facilitated by a 
trans-island track linking the mine area with 
the Weather Coast. While there are anecdo-
tal accounts of tension amongst local groups 
around the Gold Ridge area—including 
amongst the two main tribal lines—these 
conflicts are generally not well documented 
or understood.
The diverse motivations for the raid on 
the mine are discussed below. Undoubtedly, 
one of the immediate concerns was the need 
for Guadalcanal militants to obtain weapons 
quickly in response to the Malaitan/police 
ransacking of the Rove armory.7 Secondary 
to this was obtaining other ‘lootable’ mine 
items, such as vehicles. The taking of gold 
was not a motivation for the raid.
There were eight non-Malaitan PPF/
RRU officers stationed at the mine site at 
the time it was raided. Ex-militants maintain 
that aside from the firing of weapons into 
the air, the takeover was peaceful with no 
apparent harm or loss of life. This account 
is contested by former members of the RRU, 
who contend that the officers were forced 
onto the ground, seriously assaulted by 
the militants and had their high-powered 
weapons stolen (Interview with former 
RRU officers, Honiara, 22 January 2010 and 
1 April 2010).8
Four of the police officers were led away 
from the mine and into the bush at gunpoint. 
The precise intent behind this action is 
unclear. One former officer spoken to was 
of the belief that they were to be taken to the 
Weather Coast to be held hostage. Another 
believed they were being taken away to be 
murdered. Before the group had advanced 
far, in an attempted assassination, the 
officer-in-charge of police at the mine site 
was seriously wounded by a shot to the leg 
fired from a high-powered weapon. While 
the injured officer managed to escape, the 
remainder of the group was taken deeper 
into the bush. Following the intervention 
of a senior Guadalcanal militant, however, 
the group was eventually returned to the 
mine site where they remained awaiting 
transport to Honiara. Police and expatriate 
staff were eventually flown to Honiara by 
helicopter.9
Immediately following the raid, in 
alcohol-fuelled revelry, Guadalcanal mili-
tants looted and randomly shot at mine 
infrastructure and housing. Not surpris-
ingly, the mine’s operation was suspended 
indefinitely. With the mine’s closure, com-
munity members who had been relocated 
prior to the mine’s operation returned to 
their home villages.
Post-coup to pre-intervention, 
June 2000 – July 2003: the rise of 
‘Satan’ and the CNF
The conflict at the mine site took a new turn 
following the coup. The main militant group 
to emerge at the mine after June 2000 was 
known as the Central Neutral Force (CNF). 
This group was led by Special Constable 
Stanley (‘Satan’) Kaoni. Kaoni hailed from 
Totua Village in the Gold Ridge area. 
Approximately 30 individuals were part of 
Kaoni’s group—predominantly young men 
armed mainly with homemade guns. The 
CNF was typical of the disparate Guadalca-
nal groups that formed during the conflict, 
all possessing variable motives, allegiances 
and degrees of representativeness.
The CNF ransacked the mine site, taking 
explosives, stealing mine property and 
intimidating people who lived in the area. 
They also occupied part of the mine, estab-
lishing a makeshift camp.10 Armed conflict 
was commonplace. Unlike previous clashes, 
however, which had largely involved police 
and local groups, the fighting and harass-
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ment following an Australian-sponsored 
peace process in October 2000—and the 
signing of the Townsville Peace Agreement 
(TPA)—was characterised by intra-ethnic 
warfare.
The TPA saw the splintering of Guad-
alcanal militants, essentially along the 
lines of those who supported a negotiated 
peace process and those who did not. The 
two main Guadalcanal militant groups 
were the Guadalcanal Liberation Front 
(GLF), led by Harold Keke, and the Isatabu 
Freedom Movement (IFM), led by Andrew 
Te’e. Although seemingly neutral, the CNF, 
following the TPA, aligned itself with the 
latter group. Fighting between the CNF and 
the GLF around the mine site was common 
and civilians were frequently targeted. Local 
villagers (who were often seen to be aligned 
with one or the other of the militant groups) 
complained that the CNF was involved in 
acts of extortion and violence, including the 
burning of houses (Dorney 2003). Equally, 
militants aligned with Keke’s group were 
blamed for similar deeds.
Days before the arrival of a regional 
peacekeeping mission in July 2003—the 
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon 
Islands (RAMSI)—Kaoni handed over 
explosives stolen from the mine to police 
during a demobilisation ceremony at Gold 
Ridge. Despite threats to fight it out with 
RAMSI, Kaoni was arrested and remanded 
in custody in October 2003 together with 
five other members of the CNF. Kaoni’s 
arrest and the arrest of other individuals 
around Gold Ridge saw violence re-emerge 
in August 2004. About 50 men from the 
area reportedly carried out retaliatory 
raids against Kaoni’s supporters (Amnesty 
International 2004:3). Thirty homes along 
the Metapona River were said to have been 
looted and destroyed. Villagers were alleg-
edly subjected to harassment and torture.
The Central Magistrate’s Court in 
Honiara sentenced Kaoni in September 2005 
for numerous offences around the mine 
area dating from 2001, including robbery 
and abduction. Having already spent close 
to three years in prison awaiting his hear-
ing, Kaoni was released shortly after being 
sentenced.11 Kaoni is currently residing 
in the Gold Ridge area and is reportedly 
still the target of anger from some sections 
of the Gold Ridge community (Interview 
with ex-Guadalcanal militants, Honiara, 15 
December 2009).
Greed, grievance, curse? The Gold 
Ridge mine and the conflict
It has been suggested that the conflict around 
Gold Ridge was not connected to the pres-
ence or operation of the mine per se. Thus, 
Tagini (2007:339) writes that ‘[a]lthough the 
nascent mining operation might have fuelled 
sentiments, it does not appear to have had 
any direct link to the onset of the war’.
There are two rationales for the raiding of 
the mine: the securing of weapons and other 
items for the purposes of advancing the civil 
war; and what can broadly be described as 
ideological opposition to resource extraction, 
particularly goldmining. Former militants 
involved in the raid who were spoken to for 
this article tended to justify their involvement 
in terms of the latter.12 This explanation places 
the mine as a central source of conflict.
Allen (2007:141) discusses the ideologi-
cal-opposition motif. While there was strong 
conviction amongst Guadalcanal militants 
that government revenue generated from the 
mine would be used to fund the continued 
operations of the MEF (presumably through 
the police) and, more broadly, would not be 
used for the benefit of Guadalcanal,13 there 
also existed deeper historical narratives 
concerning the exploitation of Guadalcanal 
resources by outsiders.
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Various common themes emerge from 
discussions with Guadalcanal ex-militants 
around resource development on their 
island. Allen (2007:138) writes
The texts of my interviews with both 
Guale [Guadalcanal] ex-militants and 
non-combatants are peppered with the 
words ‘not fair’, ‘unfair’, ‘resources’, 
‘the government’ and ‘development’. 
The Guales strongly believe that it is 
unfair that their province provides 
a significant amount of revenue to 
the national economy from resource 
developments such as [the] Gold 
Ridge mine, the oil palm plantations 
and commercial logging, but receives 
proportionately much less from the 
national government in terms of 
grants and disbursements.14
Gold has been a central theme in his-
torical articulations of resistance to colonial 
rule and the exploitation of Guadalcanal 
resources. Grievances around goldmining 
activities can be traced to the agrarian 
philosophy of the Gaena’alu Movement (for-
merly the Moro Movement—a Guadalcanal 
custom-based socio-political movement 
originating on the Weather Coast in the 
1950s). Large-scale resource extraction is 
seen as being at odds with the movement’s 
philosophy of protecting and preserving the 
environment (Allen 2007:140).
Guadalcanal leaders and militants have 
resisted the nature of the operation at Gold 
Ridge. Allen (2007:140) quotes Sabino, the 
Gaena’alu Movement’s current president: 
Gold Ridge mine is a development 
which is too big.  It ’s  a major 
development. Okay. The movement, 
we think that this kind of development 
should not operate in the way that it 
is currently doing so.
Another account details disappoint-
ment directed at Gold Ridge landowning 
groups for ‘selling’ the ‘movement’s gold’ 
to foreigners (McDonald 2003:88). 
Much of what unfolded at Gold Ridge 
accords with analyses of natural-resource 
conflict within Melanesia and shares paral-
lels with similar disputes in Papua New 
Guinea (for example, Banks 2005, 2008; 
Haley and May 2007). Resource-related 
grievance rather than greed per se provides 
a key explanation for the raid on the mine. 
A feature of this was the relative depriva-
tion of the Weather Coast, where most of 
the Guadalcanal militants hailed from (see 
also Allen and Dinnen 2010:308–9). (As dis-
cussed, strong ties link the Gold Ridge and 
Weather Coast peoples.) Conflict associated 
with resource development in Melanesia has 
been attributed to the failure of the State 
to provide basic services (Haley and May 
2007:13). Guadalcanal ex-militants involved 
in raiding the mine expressed concern at 
benefits not being used to further the devel-
opment of their island. The Weather Coast 
region is severely underdeveloped and 
inhabitants have long expressed discontent 
at the manifest inequalities; why have so 
many ‘other’ people benefited from the land 
and resources of ‘their’ islands while they 
languish in relative disadvantage (Personal 
communication, Matthew Allen, 19 April 
2010)?15
Assaults on the mine and questioning 
of the ownership of the land on which the 
mine was sited were to provide an avenue 
through which Guadalcanal militants 
articulated their grievances. As the conflict 
progressed, however, a low-level, inter-
necine war—seemingly unconnected to the 
mine—evolved. Blatant and opportunistic 
criminality became the modus operandi of 
the groups involved.
While ideological issues are key in 
explaining resistance to the mine’s opera-
tion, two further factors are relevant. 
First, there is no doubt that the presence 
of the mine caused resentment amongst 
portions of the local populace. Settlement 
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around the mine site was almost entirely a 
result of small-scale alluvial mining, with 
subsistence gardening (and other economic 
activities) largely non-existent prior to the 
mine’s establishment (Naitoro and Iliescu 
1996:13). Moore (2004:85) states that locals 
were ‘severely disgruntled’ at being unable 
to continue their gold panning when land 
was leased to Ross Mining. Likewise, Brown 
(2003) maintains—perhaps somewhat 
romantically—that landowners who used 
to ‘grow rich’ on ‘subsistence gold mining’ 
were suddenly unable to continue their 
activities.16
Second, as discussed, was the presence 
of a large number of Malaitans, both those 
working at the mine site and their extended 
families. Malaitan presence on Guadalcanal 
was to be a key source of conflict, especially 
as hostilities progressed. Banks (2005:189) 
has contended that migration is ‘perhaps the 
most devastating of all the effects of large-
scale mining in Melanesia’. A perceived 
lack of cultural respect and challenges to 
local identity and landholding fostered 
resentment. One ex-militant spoken to 
suggested that Malaitan presence at Gold 
Ridge was one of several key reasons behind 
the raid on the mine, with local landowners 
questioning why ‘outsiders’ were needed to 
do work that they could do (Interview with 
informant, Honiara, 1 April 2010).
Government response
The Guadalcanal Provincial Government 
has given mixed messages about the mine’s 
operation. In 2005, repeating previous calls, 
the then premier opposed the mine’s reopen-
ing (‘Solomons’ Gold Ridge mine boss vows 
to continue with operation’, Pacific Islands 
Report, 29 June 1999). In the same year, the 
Balasuna Leaders’ Summit—a gathering of 
about 120 Guadalcanal leaders on Guad-
alcanal’s northern plains—was held. This 
was the first meeting of Guadalcanal lead-
ers following the civil unrest. The summit 
communiqué stated that the mine would 
reopen only after further negotiations of 
the mining agreement between landowners, 
the province and the company. It also made 
reference to a requirement of ‘acceptable 
reconciliations and rehabilitations’ (Report 
of the Leaders’ Summit 2005:39).
A year later—perhaps resigned to the 
mine’s presence—the then Guadalcanal 
premier complained about slow progress 
being made at the mine site
There’s a lot of gold out there. You don’t 
need to do prospecting now. That’s 
the only thing, that they [new owner 
Australia Solomon Gold Limited] 
are gaining time for something. And 
we’ll find out. We are taking steps, 
we don’t want any more prospecting 
to be done there. Either they start 
mining now or leave the prospecting 
and give a chance to some company 
who maybe have the money to do 
the mining. (‘Guadalcanal premier 
gives ultimatum to gold miner—start 
operating or leave’, Radio New Zealand 
International, 10 August 2006)
Come 2010—and with the imminent reo-
pening of the mine by a new owner, Allied 
Gold Limited—the current Guadalcanal 
premier is supportive of the mine’s opera-
tion (Personal communication, Stephen 
Panga, Premier of Guadalcanal Province, 
Honiara, 30 March 2010). Similarly, the 
national government is also behind the 
mine’s reopening.
Addressing the grievances
The grievances outlined above are based 
on various seemingly intractable positions: 
perceptions of the funding of a federal 
nation-state versus perceptions of localised 
economic interests (and the related law in 
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Solomon Islands that mineral resources 
belong to all of the people and the govern-
ment and that the government has the 
exclusive right to develop such resources 
as it deems to be in the national interest) 
(Mines and Minerals Act [CAP 42] ss 2[1] and 
2[3]); the desire for economic growth versus 
concerns about the various social, envi-
ronmental and economic effects of ‘major’ 
development; and historical articulations 
of resistance to perceived outsider ‘exploi-
tation’ of resources versus limited local 
capability (both technical and financial) to 
carry out mineral-resource projects.
The degree to which the above issues 
can be reconciled is questionable. Some 
views seem to be based on a misconstrued 
understanding of the role of national gov-
ernment and the arrangements as concerns 
Gold Ridge benefit payments, and different 
ideas about what ‘development’ is and how 
it is best achieved. There also appears to 
be a steadfast refusal to recognise govern-
ment legitimacy in the context of strong 
customary authority. In this regard, Naitoro 
(2000:141) states that 
[c]ustomary landowners cannot and 
have never accepted the policy of 
state ownership of minerals and this 
in itself is an obstacle to future mineral 
resources development.
In the case of Gold Ridge, the gov-
ernment has determined that it will not 
retain all royalties for all of the people of 
Solomon Islands, but will pass some of the 
benefits directly to the various Gold Ridge 
landowning groups. Royalty payments 
are channelled through the Department of 
Mines, Energy and Rural Electrification. 
Accordingly, the department acts as an 
intermediary, receiving money from the 
mine and distributing it to the various tribes 
on the basis of agreed percentages. Accord-
ing to the government, their role in the 
royalty distribution process does not create 
any tension amongst landowners and is a 
straightforward process (Personnel commu-
nication, Donn H. Tolia, Acting Permanent 
Secretary, Ministry of Mines, Energy and 
Rural Electrification, Honiara, 21 July 2010). 
The chairman and chief executive of Allied 
Gold, Mark Caruso, however, sees things 
differently, believing that ‘the problem is 
that the money has to go first to government, 
then back to the people’ (Callick 2010). Both 
the former acting permanent secretary of the 
department and Walton Naezon, a former 
minister for mines and energy, believe that 
government involvement in royalty distri-
bution is an important check, ensuring that 
the correct royalties are paid by the mine 
(Personal communication, Walter Naezon, 
Honiara, 28 July 2010).
A process of constitutional reform is 
currently under way in Solomon Islands. A 
draft federal constitution has been prepared 
(Draft Federal Constitution of Solomon Islands, 
June 2009, http://www.sicr.gov.sb/). Under 
the proposed arrangements, minerals will 
no longer de jure belong to the people and 
the government. Instead, control and own-
ership of minerals will rest in the hands of 
indigenous tribes/clans. It is unclear what 
role the national government is intended to 
play in the royalty distribution process. The 
pace at which constitutional reforms will be 
implemented is unclear and it is unlikely 
that any major initiatives will take place in 
the short term.
Today, one of the key grievances relates 
to the environmental effects of the mine. Run-
off from the tailings dam into the Metapona 
River has been a constant source of concern 
for communities downstream of the mine. 
River water is used for bathing, washing, 
cooking and irrigation. As was the case 
immediately prior to the initial opening of the 
mine (Moore 2004:86), today, communities 
remain fearful of possible cyanide poisoning 
and have recently complained of skin irrita-
tion following exposure to river water.
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The power of downstream communities 
was recognised in a sociological impact 
study commissioned by the mine’s former 
owners prior to the mine’s establishment 
(Naitoro and Iliescu 1996:27): 
These down stream villages are part 
of the Gold Ridge people and are able 
to exert forces on the project if they 
are left out of the decision making 
process.
Concerns from downstream communi-
ties eventually saw the formation of the 
Metapona Downstream Association, which 
sought compensation for the environmental 
damage it said had been caused by the mine. 
Three separate legal cases against the mine 
were filed in the High Court of Solomon 
Islands in 1997—one of which raised the 
issue of dangerous discharges into the river. 
Ultimately, the litigation was unsuccessful, 
with the plaintiffs unable to establish that 
the mine operations would cause ‘imminent 
and substantial damage to…[their] property, 
business or livelihood’ (Saki and Others v 
Ross Mining [Solomon Islands] Limited and 
Others, Civil Case No. 169 of 2007, per 
Palmer J.).
The degree to which present environ-
mental concerns are real or otherwise is to 
some extent a moot point, with community 
perceptions being key. Reassurances by 
Allied Gold have not allayed the fears of 
sections of some downstream communities, 
such as Pitukoli and Tuararana, and the 
company faces the threat of roadblocks from 
aggrieved villagers.
Conclusion
Gold Ridge features prominently in Solomon 
Islands’ near-term efforts to foster economic 
growth, especially following the anticipated 
decline in commercial forestry. Prior to the 
current PNG liquefied natural gas project, it 
was said that Gold Ridge—while no larger 
than the smallest of the four major mining 
operations in Papua New Guinea—would 
contribute as much to the Solomon Islands 
economy as the mining and petroleum sec-
tors contribute to the PNG economy (Filer 
and McIntyre 2006:219).
Following an investment of approxi-
mately A$150 million by Allied Gold, 
Gold Ridge’s first pour is scheduled for 
the first half of 2011 (Mamu 2010:10; see 
also Allied Gold Limited 2010b:6). Allied 
is reporting that about 500 local jobs will 
be created when the mine is operational 
(Letzutini 2010:3). Moreover, the company 
has recently lodged an exploration permit 
for an additional 129 sq km around the mine 
area (Allied Gold Limited 2010a). 
The existing royalty distribution 
arrangements will remain under the mine’s 
new owners, with the same allocations 
and royalties continuing to be channelled 
through the Department of Mines, Energy 
and Rural Electrification. National govern-
ment revenue will be principally in the form 
of export duties, a corporate tax of 30 per 
cent (expected to become payable during 
the fourth year of operations) and a 15 per 
cent goods tax on consumables and fuel. It 
is likely to take some years following the 
recommencement of production before any 
significant tax revenues are realised.
If the words of former Guadalcanal 
militants are to be believed, tensions still run 
high around resource extraction on Guad-
alcanal, including the Gold Ridge mine. 
Continuing concerns about landownership 
and sub-national and national government 
arrangements are yet to be addressed. The 
extent to which development takes place 
outside Honiara is a live issue, although 
little seems to have occurred to date and 
the Weather Coast remains one of the most 
impoverished areas in Solomon Islands. A 
government-organised and sanctioned rec-
onciliation ceremony in Vulolo Ward, where 
the mine is located, is yet to occur, which is 
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apparently a cause of concern amongst some 
community members. Also, in the absence of 
state introduced forgiveness legislation, the 
current Minister for Fisheries and Marine 
Resources, and former MEF Commander, 
has foreshadowed payback against the mine 
by sections of local communities owing to 
the selective incarceration of their relatives 
(Jimmy Lusibaea interviewed in Braithwaite 
et al, 2010:89).
In order to lower the potential for 
future conflict, the environmental, social 
and economic impacts of the Gold Ridge 
mine will need to be carefully managed 
and monitored. The near-term security 
of Solomon Islands, and the Gold Ridge 
mine, is linked to the continued presence 
of RAMSI. In a statement unlikely to inspire 
confidence, Mark Caruso, the chairman and 
chief executive of Allied Gold, provides tacit 
acknowledgment of the less than ideal secu-
rity situation in Solomon Islands. In recent 
comments to an Australian newspaper, he 
remarked that in the advent of trouble it 
helps to be a ‘couple of hours’ flight away 
from Australia’ (Callick 2010).
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Notes
1 The Gold Ridge mine is located on central 
Guadalcanal, approximately 40 km southeast 
of Honiara (see Figure 1). During the con-
flict, the mine was owned by an Australian 
company, Ross Mining NL Limited. In May 
2000, the mine was taken over by another 
Australian miner, Delta Gold. The mine is 
currently owned by Allied Gold Limited—
also an Australian company.
2 Moore (2004:104) states that many senior staff 
at the mine, including engineers and chem-
ists, were from Malaita.
3 In February 2000, the newsletter of the Isat-
abu Freedom Movement reported incidents 
of harassment of local villages around the 
mine by PPF officers (‘Police officers harass 
villagers’, Isatabu Tavuli, 1[2][18 February 
2000]:1).
4 This contrasts with the picture being painted 
by Ross Mining, which—most likely in an ef-
fort to soothe worried investors—maintained 
that about this time the national government, 
provincial government and local communi-
ties continued to support the operation of the 
mine (Lyday 1999).
5 Clashes with police would eventually lead 
local landowners to demand compensation 
from the government for lives lost.
6 At least one media report predating the raid 
details a threat by Guadalcanal ‘rebels’ to 
close the mine (Elder 2000).
7 Approximately 12 weapons were stolen from 
police stationed at the mine. This roughly 
accords with Moore’s (2004:188) observation 
that, come 2003, it was ‘well known’ that 
Harold Keke had 12 high-powered weapons 
stolen from Gold Ridge and police posts 
around Guadalcanal.
8 Pursuant to an agreement with the Guadal-
canal militants, the police stationed at Gold 
Ridge kept their weapons in their rooms at 
the mine site. 
9 This accords with media reports. Some 125 
people, including foreign nationals, were 
transported from the mine site to Honiara 
via helicopter (‘Solomons’ Gold Ridge mine 
boss vows to continue with operation’, Pacific 
Islands Report, 29 June 1999).
10 Interestingly, in November 2000, a member 
of the CNF sought compensation from the 
mine for ‘guarding’ it during the period of 
civil conflict (‘Army asked to help return 
Bougainvilleans from Solomons’, Pacific 
Islands Report, 24 November 2000).
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11 Court file, Central Magistrate’s Court, Honiara 
(inspected on 26 March 2010). As of March 
2004, there were said to be at least 30 police 
files outstanding for offences allegedly com-
mitted by members of the CNF around the 
Gold Ridge area. Ultimately, however, much 
less than this number were to be convicted 
for their actions: see Kabui J., Tara v Regina, 
unreported, High Court of Solomon Islands, 
19 March 2004 (available from http://www.
paclii.org/sb/cases/SBHC/2004/25.html, 
accessed 22 March 2010). 
12 An area of contestation is the degree to which 
ex-militants acted on their own devices or 
were manipulated by certain individuals 
largely for reasons of personal gain. There is 
also a question as to what extent ex-militants 
have attempted to explain their various crimi-
nal actions as furthering a justified cause.
13 This was the view put in an interview with ex-
Guadalcanal militants, Honiara, 15 December 
2009.
14 There are no publicly available figures detail-
ing the extent to which Guadalcanal Province 
contributes to national revenues. Further, at 
the time of the civil conflict, the arrangements 
for the allocation of provincial grants by the 
national government were not well under-
stood. Cox and Morrison (2004:20) stated that 
‘[t]he formula and process to determine…
the total provincial grants is not known and 
cannot be explained by Provincial staff or the 
DPG&CD [Department of Provincial Gov-
ernment and Constituency Development]’. 
There has historically been no correlation 
between province size and the amount of 
national government funding provided, with 
large variations in provincial grant funding 
per capita between provinces.
15 On the deprivation of the Weather Coast, see 
Tara (1990).
16 There are no records detailing gold produc-
tion through panning, making it difficult 
to determine exact production levels and 
revenue. Most gold obtained through this 
means was sold to Chinese buyers. The only 
records available are those for legal gold ex-
ports (Naitoro and Iliescu 1996:13); however, 
one report puts gold production ‘sold to the 
bank’ through panning at 25 kg between 1994 
and 1997 (Thompson 2007:5).
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